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In The Supreme Court
of the State .of Utah
LOUIS J. :MONTER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
KRATZER'S SPECIALTY BREAD
COMP ANY, a corporation,

Case No.
12810

Defendant-Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This was an action by a landlord for restitution
of leased property and a counterclaim by the tenant for
damages resulting from wrongful eviction of the tenant
by the landlord.
DISPOSITION OF CASE
IN TRIAL COURT
The Court entered a Judgment for Plaintiff-Appellant in the amount of $2,166.99 and for DefendantRespondent on its counterclaim in the amount of
$102,278.56, plus $3,000.00 punitive damages.
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STATEl\lENT OF Ij'ACTS
Defendant-Respondent does not agree with Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of Facts, since it alleges
some facts not in the record and mistates and omits
other relevant facts. Therefore, the following Statement of }_,acts is presented by Defendant-Respondent:
On February 28, 1970, the Plaintiff-Appellant,
LOUIS J. :MONTER, leased the property at 1241
l\lajor Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, to DefendantRespondent, KRATZER'S SPECIALTY BREAD
COl\lP ANY, for five years, by a written agreement
(Exhibit 2-D). This lease agreement was amended by
the execution of an addendum to the lease on December
10, 1970 (Exhibit 3-D), which provided for a fortyfive day grace period for the payment of the monthly
lease payments of $47 5.00.
l\lonthly lease payments were paid by KRATZER'S to l\IONTER until August of 1971. On Sep·
tember 28, 1971, l\10NTER caused a "Three Day
Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate" ( R. 51) to be delivered
to KRATZ"F.H'S place of business. On October 1, 1971,
a check drawn by Donna Poulson, an employee of
KRATZER'S was delivered to MONTER's attorneys
in payment of the August lease payment. l\frs. Poulson
had made arrangements with her bank to cover this
check ( R. 179), but when it was presented to the bank,
it was returned marked "refer to maker."
On October 18, 1971, :MONTER's attorneys filed
a Complaint asking for restitution of the property and
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"following restitution for leave to amend this Complaint
to include a prayer for damages resulting from waste
caused by the Defendant, rent lost by Plaintiff until
a new tenant is obtained ... " (R. 84-87). A three-day
Summons was delivered to the Sheriff on October 28,
1971, and served upon KRATZER'S on October 29,
1971, a Friday. ( R. 52-53) . Jerome Y eek, President of
KRATZER'S, contacted .MONTER's attorney on
November 3, 1971, and told him he had records showing the rent had been paid. He was instructed to bring
his records in and was led to believe that no default
would be taken in the meantime ( R. 7'8a) . These records
were instead taken to KRATZER'S attorneys' office
and an answer to the Complaint was prepared and
filed on Friday, November 5, 1971. ( R. 79, 80) . It was
later discovered that MONTER's attorney had filed a
default judgment on the morning of November 5, 1971,
providing for the issuance of a Writ of Restitution (R.
73). A Writ of Restitution was issued and placed in the
hands of the Sheriff for service on the same day by
1\fONTER's attorney (R. 43-45).
On :Monday, November 8, 1971, the sheriff and
MONTER's attorney entered the premises of KRATZER'S at 1241 :Major Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,
between 12 :30 and 12 :45 o'clock P.l\tI., stopped work
at the premises, ordered all employees out, changed the
locks on the doors, and closed down the operation of
KRATZER'S business. Between 1 :15 and 2:00 o'clock
P.M., KRATZER'S attorney had a telephone conversation with MONTER's attorney, who was still at the
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bakery with the Sheriff. In that conversation, KRATZER'S attorney quoted Section 78-36-10 U .C.A. to
l\IONTER's attorney, and further told him they had
no right to close down the bakery on that day and if the
actions of MONTER, through his attorney and the
Sheriff, caused any loss of business or damage, a lawsuit would be commenced against l\IONTER. In spite
of this warning, l\IONTER's attorney instructed the
Sheriff to go ahead with the eviction and the Sheriff
did so. ( R. 39-40, 148-149).
After several more telephone conversations that
day, l\IONTER's attorneys decided they were acting
wrongfully in closing down the business and later gave
the Sheriff a release to allow KRATZER'S employees
back in the premises. It was approximately 5 :30 o'clock
P.l\I. before they were back to work. (R. 149-150). In
the meantime, while the bakery was closed, Continental
Baking Company, a customer of KRATZER'S for
more than sixteen years (R. 158), had been unable to
call their orders into KRATZER'S. Continental Bread
Sales :Manager, Jack Hart, thereupon personally went
to l\:RATZER'S Bakery, found the premises locked
and nobody present and then placed their orders with
another bakery. From that day on, in spite of KRAT·
ZER'S attempts to regain its business, Continental has
refused to buy from KRATZER'S because, in view of
the closing of the business, it had no assurance that it
would continue to get products from KRATZER'S.
Although Continental had experienced some quality and
delivery problems with KRATZER'S, Mr. Hart testi·
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fied that these were considered normal and typical of
other bakers as well. He further testified that Continental would not have terminated the long-standing relationship with KRATZER'S except for their inability
to obtain products on N evember 8, 1971, and that had
this incident on November 8, 1971, been the only incident to occur, Continental would still have terminated
the account. ( R. 125-129).
KRATZER'S thereupon filed a motion to set
aside the default judgment, stay execution and allow
the filing of a counterclaim ( R. 74) , and tendered into
Court $1,42.5.00, representing the lease payments for
August, September, and October of 1971, all of which
was not yet past due. (R. 57). This motion was granted
on November 19, 1971, ( R. 69), and trial set for December 10, 1971, at the request of MONTER's attorney. KRATZER'S counterclaim was filed November
22, praying for damages for lost business in an unknown
amount, but in excess of $5,000.00 and also $5,000.00
punitive damages. (R. 62).
Priar to the trial, statements were presented to
l\IONTER's attorney showing the volume of business
done by KRATZER'S with Continental prior to Continental's termination of the account. These statements
were verified to NIONTER's attorney by Jack Hart of
Continental. Statements were also presented as to the
relative costs to and profits realized by KRATZER'S
on this account. Based on this information, it was stipulated at the trial, that KRATZER'S received an av-
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erage gross income from Continental of $2,000.00 per
month and that 53% of this, or $1,060.00 per month,
was profit. ( R. 153-154). There was no evidence that
the relationship with Continental would not continue
indefinitely into the future and, of course, 1\fr. Hart
of Continental testified that the acocunt would not
have been terminated except for the actions of MONTER. (R. 128).
Based upon present value tables in evidence and
the testimony of an expert witness, the Court determined
the present value of the lost profits of KRA TZER'S
of $1,060.00 per month over ten years into the future
to be $102,278.56, and entered judgment therefor. The
actions of l\10NTER, by and through his attorneys,
were found to he wrongful and because done with full
knowledge of the law and in spite of warnings, were
intentional and malicious. Therefore, punitive damages
of $3,000.00 were also awarded.
l\IONTER thereafter filed a motion for a new
trial claiming surprise and newly discovered evidence.
This motion was denied by the Court because it was
obvious from the pleadings and transcript that there
was no surprise (R. 14-15). The so-called new evidence
was known to l\10NTER and had been available to his
attorneys prior to trial, from the same sources from
which they subsequently obtained the inofrmation. Furthermore, in spite of the actions of the Internal Rev·
enue Service, KRATZER'S business is still in opera·
tion and has every prospect of continuing.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The court property held that the eviction of Defendant-Respondent and closure of it.Y business was
wrongful and in violation of the provisions of Section
78-36-10 U.C.A. The judgment was invalid and execution on its was untimely.
The pertinent provisions of Forcible Entry and
Detainer statute define unlawful detainer ( § 78-36-3),
prescribe the manner of service ( § 78-36-6) , set out the
allegations required in the Complaint ( § .78-36-8), and
describe the matters for which judgment may be taken
and when it may be enformed (§ 78-36-10). The following language from these provisions is important to
a determination of the propriety of l\10NTER's actions
in this case:
Allegations permitted in complaint
.... In case the unlawful detainer charged is
after default in the payment of rent, the complaint must state the amount of such rent ...."
(emphasis added) .
"78-36-8.

Judgment - of restitution; for
damages and rent. . . . When the proceeding
is for an unlawful detainer after default in the
payment of the rent, and the lease or agree1nent under which the rent is payable has not
"78-36-10.
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by its term.~ expired, e;reculion upo11 the judgment shall not be issued until the expiration of
five days after the entr.lJ of the judgment,
within which time the tenant or any sub-tenant,
or any mortgagee of the term, or other party
interested in its continuance, may pay into court
for the lnncUord the amount of the judgment
and costs, and thereupon the judgment shall
be satisfied, and the tenant shall be restored
to his estate; but if payment as herein provided
is not made within the five days, the judgment
may he enforced for its full amount, and for
the possession of the premises. In all other
cases the judgment may be enforced immediately." (emphasis added)
It should be noted that :MONTER failed to comply with these provisions from the time his Complaint
was filed, the result of which was to deny KRATZER'S
right to pay rent into court and be restored to its
estate. The Complaint did not ask for any judgment
for rent, but only for restitution and for leave to amend
following restitution to pray for rent lost and for
waste. This was done in spite of the statutory require·
ment that the Complaint must state the amount of rent
in default. The unlawful detainer claimed by MONTER was after an alleged defa ult in the payment of
rent and the proceeding was brought specifically for
failure to pay that rent, and for no other reason, asap·
pears from the "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Va-
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cate" (R. 51) served upon KRATZER'S. This notice
states that action would be commenced " . . . to take
judgment against you for the rent accrued .... " This
notice must be the basis of any unlawful detainer proceeding brought by MONTER and any proceeding for
waste or breach of covenants would be improper. It
should also be noted that MONTER made no attempt
to prove any waste or breach of covenant at the trial,
but only non-payment of rent. Since the alleged unlawful detainer was based solely upon non-payment of rent,
it was wholly improper for :Monter to ask only for restitution in his Complaint and not for a judgment for
unpaid rent. The effect of this is to deprive the tenant
of the substantive right, granted by the statute, to pay
the rent into court and be restored to his estate. Based
upon this fact alone, the judgment for restitution was
invalid. V 011les v. Stralw, 77 Utah 171, 292 Pac. 913, at
914 (1930). Therefore, any action taken on that judgment was wrongful.
Having obtained an improper judgment, however,
MONTER failed again to comply with the statute
when he attempted to enforce his judgment for restitution by causing a Writ of Restitution to be issued on
Friday, November 5, 1971, the same day judgment was
entered, and then causing the Sheriff to wrongfully
evict KRATZER'S from the premises and close down
KRATZER'S business on Monday, November 8, 1971.
Section 78-36-10 U.C.A. requires execution upon n
judgment to wait five days after entry of the judgment "when the proceeding is for unlawful detainer
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after default in the payment of rent, and the lease ...
has not by its terms expired." This was precisely the case
before the court. KRATZER'S had a long-term lease
which had more than three years to run. It is perhaps
important to note that this five-day waiting period does
not apply to the majority of unlawful detainer cases
which are brought for holding over after termination
of month-to-month tenancies, tenancies-at-will or expired leases. This important statutory right to be restored to the estate is given only to those who have a
substantial investment in a longterm lease and_ perhaps
related leasehold improvements, trade fixtures and
equipment.
A. landlord may not repossess his property without resorting to the remedies provided in the Forcible
Entry and Detainer statute, regardless of his le.goal ri!lht
to the property, and the failure to follow the proYisions
of the statute gives the tenant a cause of action for the
invasion of his rights under the statute and he should
be awarded any damages proved. King v. Firm, 3 Utah '
2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 ( 1955). The facts in the case
now before the court are almost identical to those in the
case of Freewall Parle Building, Inc. v. TVestern States
TVholesale SupplJJ, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P.2d 778
( 1969). In that case an action was commenced to collect past due rentals under a long-term written lease.
A Writ of Attachment was obtained and the attorney
for the landlord accompanied the officer executing the
"\iV rit and directed him to attach the inventory and to re·
move the tenant's employees and change the locks on all '
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of the doors. The tenant counterclaimed for wrongful
attachment and wrongful eviction. The court held that,
even if the attachment was lawful, the eviction was unlawful for failure to follow the requirements of the unlawful detainer statute and the landlord was liable for
such damages as it caused including possibie punitive
damages. That case governs the instant case and the
eviction of KRATZER'S by .MONTER was accordingly wrongful and in violation of the rights of tenants
granted by § 78-36-10 U.C.A.
The foregoing conclusion applies whether judgment is taken by default or after a trial. The attempt
by appellant in his Brief to apply the five-day waiting
period in § 78-36-10 only to judgments after a trial and
not to default judgments is strained and far-fetched.
A tenant should not be deprived of a substantive right
expressly granted by statute by strained implication
from former statutes. There is certainly no express indication in the former or present statute~ nor any suggestion, that default judgments were to be treated differently than judgments upon a trial. In fact, it is just
as reasonable to imply that the failure to re-enact the
old provision with respect to default judgments was
for the purpose of bringing all judgments, default and
otherwise, under§ 78-36-10. The heading of that section
is not entitled "Trials" or anything similar. It is entitled
"Judgments." And no other section deals with defaults.
The particular provision containing the five-day waiting period is not limited by the necessity for a trial. It
is only qualified by the words "When the proceeding is
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for an unlawful detainer after default in the payment
of the rent, and the lease or agreement under which the
rent is payable has not by its terms expired." Neither
the original nor the present statute has been construed
in the manner appellant is now suggesting. The right
granted by § 78-36-10 is a matter of importance and if
it did not apply in certain cases one would expect the
legislature to expressly say so.
l'urthermore, why could not a tenant decide, in the
interest of saving time, trouble and expense, to give up
his right to contest the disputed amount of rent, allow
a default to be entered and then tender the rent into
court and be restored to his estate as the statute provides ..Moreover, the statute grants the same right to
pay the rent into court during the fi\'e-day waiting
period to "any sub-tenant, or any mortgagee of the
term, or other party interested in (the lease's) continu·
ance." These are parties who might not be, and probably
are not, parties to the action and they should not be deprived of their statutory right because judgment is taken
by default. The suggested distinction between defaults
and trials does not make sense when viewed in this light.
The only reasonable interpretation is that the five-day
waiting period applies to all judgments based on de~
fault in rent due under unexpired leases.
Appellant's reliance on Commercial Block Realty
Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505, 267
Pac 1009 ( 1928), appears to be misplaced. There the
court is emphasizing the fact that the statute was de·
signed to provide the tenant with safeguards. The case
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states that even if the tenant fails to tender the rent to
the lancllord, "he is not deprived of his lease. He may
await the judicial determination of the amount of rent,
and after judgment pay the rent and costs and be restored to his estate." The court does not suggest that
the tenant must dispute the amount of rent or that a
triable issue must be involved. Rather, it indicates that
the tenant may wait until after judgment to pay the
rent and costs.
Again, the suggestion of appellant that the statute
doesn't apply in this case is untenable in view of the fact
that no judgment for rent was sought. The Complaint
asked only for restitution and did not yet bring the
matter of rent before the ocurt. KRATZER'S protected its position anyway by tendering $1,425.00 into court
within the five-day period. This amount represented
the rent claimed to be in default and also rent for additional months which was not yet delinquent. However
sincerely appellant now urges a different interpretation, he was apparently convinced of the wrongfulness
of his actions on November 8, 1971, when he decided to
allow KRATZER'S back in the premises. Of course,
the damage had already been done by then, but after
the warning issued by KRATZER'S attorney and a
full afternoon to consider the matter, appellant and his
attorneys obviously realized that KRATZER'S rights
had been violated and damages might result. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason to allow KRATZER'S back in the premises.
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II.
The Forcible Entr.IJ and Detainer ..;;tatute is a special statutory proceeding and the Rule.~ of Civil Procedure covering execution do not apply in this case.
Section 78-36-10 U.C.A. grants to a tenant a substantive right to pay a judgment for rent and be restored to his estate under an unexpired lease. That section sets forth the time after which execution may issue.
The required five-day waiting period is automatic and
requires no action by the tenant to make it effective.
The argument by appellant that Rule 62 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure supercedes or replaces
the tenant's rights under § 78-36-10 flies in the face
of the express conditions as to applicability of the rules.
Rule 81 provides as follows:

"AP,PLICABILITY OF RULES
IN GENERAL
(a) Special Statutory Proceedings. These
rules shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by
their nature clearly inapplicable. . . . " (emphasis added)
It would appear that no rule could be more clearly
inapplicable to proceedings upon execution under §7836-10 than Rule 62 (a) providing for immediate execu·
tion upon a judgment. Unlawful detainer is a special
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statutory proceeding providing particular rights and
remedies and prescribing the means of enforcing them.
"\Vhere the Rules of Civil Procedure are in conflict with
this statute, the Rules do not apply. The Rules are
clearly inapplicable where they deprive a tenant of a
substantive right granted by statute. Appellant might
just as well argue that the manner of service of unlawful detainer notices prescribed by § 78-36-6, or that
the shortening of the time for appearance to three days
prescribed by § 78-36-8, or that the ten-day time for
appeal prescribed by § 78-36-ll, do not apply in unlawful detainer proceedings because the Rules of Civil
Procedure provide a different manner or time for these
matters. The Forcible Entry and Detainer statute is
ohYiously a special statutory proceeding to which the
Rules of Civil Procedure are in many respects clearly
inapplicable.
Even if the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute
is not a special statutory proceeding, the Rules of Civil
Proceclure "may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant." § 78-2-4 U.C.A. In
this case, the legislature has prescribed that a tenant has
a right to be restored to his estate and the procedural
rules cannot abridge or modify that right. Only the legislature can do so. Appellant argues that requiring a
court order for a stay of execution is not clearly inapplicable, citing as authority the fact that the California statute, upon which Utah's statute was based,
has been amended to do exactly that (Appellant's
Brief, p. 16). The point is that Utah's statute has not
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been amended and only the legislature can do so. There·
fore, in Utah, the automatic five-day waiting period is
still the law.
Appellant claims that a rule requiring an af firmati,·e act by the party seeking a stay of execution would
not abridge, modify or enlarge his right to such a stay.
In doing so, he overlooks the fact that § 78-36-10 was
designed to prevent an immediate execution and that it
may take the losing party more than five days to obtain a stay of execution, especially if he must prepare
and file a motion for a stay and set it for hearing before the court. By that time, the five-day period will
have expired and the motion for a stay is a useless
gesture. Furthermore, Rule 62 (a) leaves the granting
of a stay within the discretion of the court and upon
such security as the court may require. This is in direct
conflict with § 78-36-10, which makes the stay automatic, not disrretionary, and requires no security to obtain the stay. In fact, the payment of the rent and
costs into court within the five days is all the security
the landlord needs. It should not be necessary to state
that if the judgment for restitution is taken by default
or if another party interested in the continuance of the
lease, but not a party to the action, desires to pay the
rent into court to preserve the lease, the execution will
have been served and the damages done before it is
known that a judgment has been entered. This is pre·
cisely what happened in the case now before the court.
The appellant's interpretation therefore emasculates
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the rights of the tenant and other parties as granted by
the legislature.

III.
The damages found by the Court were proper and
were supported by the evidence and stipulations of the
parties.

The Court's findings as to the fact that damage
had been caused to KRATZER'S by the wrongful actions of :MONTER and as to the amount of those
damages were fully supported by the evidence. In fact,
the evidence was almost wholly in favor of the findings
and it is difficult to see how the Court could have found
otherwise. Of course, the findings of the Court are presumed to be correct and should not he disturbed if there
is some support in the evidence. These are cardinal rules
of review. Charlton v. Hackett, II Utah 2d 389, 360
P.2d 176 (rn6I).
The fact of damage was proved by the testimony
of an impartial witness (R. 123 and 129) and there
was no evidence introduced by .MONTER to contradict
his testimony. It was first established that Continental
Baking Company had been a customer of KRATZER'S for seventeen years-a long-standing and obviously compatible and continuing relationship. Then
.Mr. Jack Hart, the Bread Sales l\Ianager of Continental, testified that Continental's salesmen had been unable to reach KRATZER'S by telephone on November
8, 1971, to place orders for the next day, so he person-
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ally went down to KRATZER'S place of business to
determine the reason. After finding the ha kery locked
and closed up and nobody on the premises, he returned
and placed their orders with another bakery. Continental
has since refused to do further business with KRATZER'S because l\lr. Hart felt he had no assurance that
he could continue to get products from KRATZER'S
in view of l\IONT.ER's actions. Although Continental
had experienced some quality and delivery problems
with KRATZER'S, :Mr. Hart testified that these were
considered normal and typical of other bakers as well.
Then Mr. Hart responded to questions as follows:
"Q In spite of those other problems you
have mentioned, was your inability to get
products on November the 8th the reason for
your termination of your business with
KRATZER'S?

"A

Yes, I'd say so.

"Q Would it be fair to say that you
would not have terminated that relationship
then except for that inability?

"A

Yes." (R. 128}

On cross-examination, Mr. Hart further responded
as follows:
"Q Had this incident on November the
8th been the only incident to occur in your ex-
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perience, would you have terminated the account?
"A I think, under the conditions that
existed that day, yes." (R. 129)
Based upon the uncontroverted testimony, it was
certainly reasonable for the Court to conclude that the
long-standing relationship between KRATZER'S and
Continental would have continued into the future except for the wrongful actions of .l\IONTER in closing
down KllATZER'S business. Appellant's attempt to
bring this unchallenged testimony into question is based
upon a recitation of the facts out of context with no
refercnce to the record and the omission of other relevant facts ..l\Ir. Hart's lack of assurance of getting
products was not based on other problems, as claimed
by appellant, but on the closing of the business on November 8, 1971, and the uncertainty as to what further
action l\IONTER might take. The attempt to base the
termination of KRATZER'S on the fact that it had
new management is also out of context since the present
manager had been with Continental during the entire
relationship with KRATZER'S, starting as clean-up
boy and progressing through delivery boy to baker and
.Manager. (R. 157-158).
As to the amount of damages, appellant has devoted a considerable portion of his Brief to citation of
out-of-state cases to the effect that damges for lost
profits must not be speculative or conjectural. None of
these cases is directly in point~ although some of them
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may support respondent's position. It must be remembered that future profits, while allowable as damages,
cannot be proYed by any other means than projection
from past profits. The general law as to proof of lost
profits is found in 22 Am.J ur. 2d., Damages:
"§ 172 .
. . . . No recovery can be had for loss of profits
which are determined to be uncertain, contingent, conjectural, or speculative. Thus, no recovery can be had for loss of profits where it
is uncertain whether any profit at all would
have been made by the Plaintiff. But it must
be _borne in mind that prospective profits are
to some extent uncertain and problematical,
and so, on that account or on account of the
difficulties in the way of proof, a person complaining of breach of contract is not deprived
of all remedy; uncertainty merely as to the
amount of profits that would have been made
does not prevent recovery....
"§ 173.
A distinction is drawn between claims for
profits derived from a new business venture
and those derived from a going concern .... Accordingly, recovery for lost profits is not generally allowed for injury to a new business
with no history of profits. The same prohibition does not apply to the established business
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with an experience of profits ....
"§ 177 .
. . . it is generally held that prospective profits
from an established business, prevented or interrupted by the tortious conduct of the defendant, are recoverable when it is proved
( 1) that it is reasonably certain that such
profits would have been realized except for the
tort, and ( 2) that the lost profits can be ascertained and measured, from the evidence introduced, with reasonable certainty....
" ... Where the wrongful act of the defendant
is of such a nature as to prevent determination
of the exact amount of damages, the defendant
is not allowed to insist on absolute certainty,
but only that the evidence show the lost profits
by reasonable inference .... "
In the case now before the Court, there is no problem of uncertainty or speculation as to the amount of
damages. Respondent appeared in Court with a box
full of records, prepared to prove the volume of business done by KRATZER'S with Continental prior to
November 8, 1971. These records and a typed summary
of them were presented to appellant prior to the trial
and after examination of them and consultation with
the representative of Continental, appellant voluntarily
decided to shorten an otherwise lengthy trial and stipulate to certain facts which KRATZER'S could prove
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and he could not controvert. It was therefore stipulated
that, considering seasonal variations and other factors,
the average monthly volume of business done with
Continental by KRATZEH'S was it;2,ooo.oo. Of this
amount, 47% was overhead and 53% or $1,060.00 was
profit. The Court was not required to speculate or conjecture as to damages, but could easily base its findings
on the stipulation of the parties. The Com-t was then
assisted by the testimony of an expert witness to determine the present value of this average monthly
profit over various periods of time into the future based
upon prevailing interest rates and present value tables
in evidence.
The only question that could be raised is as to the
length of time over which this monthly profit should be
considered. The Court's finding here is also amply supported by the evidence that this business relationship
had existed for seventeen years and would have continued except for the actions of l\IONTER, as Mr.
Hart testified. The fact that ~Jr. Hart took the time
and trouble to go down to KRATZER'S place of business, instead of just calling a competitor, indicates a
desire to continue dealing with KRATZER'S and re·
inforces l\Ir. Hart's stated intent to deal with KRATZER'S, again, except for MONTER's actions. The
only speculation in connection with this finding is that
proposed in appellant's Brief, in his desperate search
to find some way to attack the unquestioned continua·
tion of a long-standing relationship. The Court could
have justified a much longer period of time over which
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to assess damages, but settled on ten years, since the
present value of J{IlATZER'S damages began to level
off after ten years.
In spite of the fact that the stipulated and uncontroverted facts of this case are more than sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the general law quoted
above, the Utah law requires less certainty and allows
more inference in the determination of lost profits. In
Freeway Parlo: Building, Inc. v. TVcstern States JVholesale Supply, supra, the facts of which are cited above,
this Court stated that "the landlord is in a poor position
to insist that the damages he caused must be proved to
a mathematical certainty." In that case, there was evidence that the tenant had made a profit during the five
months immediately preceding the landlord's wrongful
actions. The records were not complete and an accountant, doing the best he could with what he had, calculated
the gross sales for the five-month period and the net
profit. The Court stated, at pages 783-784:
"The fact that a business has not been in operation long enough to have a history of profit
or loss should not deprive one of the right to
convince a jury, if he can do so, that he would
have made a profit if his business had not been
interfered with...•
"Where no books are kept in a simple business
enterprise, an estimate of profits may be given
by one who is experienced in the business.

24

Graham llotel Companv vs. Garrett, 33 S.W.
2d 522 (Tex. Cir. A pp. 1930).
"In this case concrete data was given in evidence; and while the records were not suf fi.
cient to give the exact prior earnings, we think
they were sufficient to enable the jury to infer
the amount of damages, if any, which were
occasioned by reason of the wrongful attachment and eviction, and thus to give a just
verdict in the case. . . .
" ... we also think the jury should be permitted to determine whether the landlord acted
maliciously in evicting the tenants so as to
justify the imposition of punitive damages,
and if so, the amount thereof."
In the case before the Court, the Trial Judge, sitting in place of a jury, should be permitted to make the
same determination and the same inferences. Yet, the
evidence is much stronger here since we are dealing with
an established business with a long-standing relationship with a customer and stipulations as to both gross
and net profits. The only inference made was with respect to the time that relationship might continue. This,
of course, is impossible of proof as to the exact time,
but the evidence is more than sufficient to support the
inference made by the Trial Judge.
The Freeway Park Building case is also authority
for the propriety of punitive damages. There the land·
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lord, acting entirely through his attorney and the executing officer, removed the employees from the premises,
changed the locks on the door and closed down the business. The Court stated that the jury would have been
justified in finding punitive damages based on those
facts. See also Har grave v. Leigh, 73 Utah 178, 273
Pac. 2!)8 ( 1928), where the court, on similar facts, held
that malicious conduct could be implied. In the case of
KRATZEU'S bakery business, it is certainly obvious
that even a temporary closure of the business would
have an immediate detrimental effect on profits and
customer relationships. Products must be produced and
delivered on a daily basis and at precise times. The
wrongful disruption of this kind of business should certainly be treated more seriously than the home-improvement business in F'ree"l.cay Parle Building. The landlord's complete lack of concern for this obvious fact
should also make the inference of' malicious intent much
easier. Furthermore, the wrongfulness of MONTER's
actions were made known to him and a warning given
that suit would follow those actions prior to the time
any serious damage had been done. l\lONTER's closure of the business in the face of this knowledge certainly constitutes an intentional and wreckless disregard
of KRATZER'S rights. This is sufficient to constitute malice in law, if not in fact, and is easily the basis
for the implication or inference of malice as is proper
under both Hargrave v. Leigh, and Freeway Park
Building, cited above.
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Appellant complains that the trial court did not
consider the effect of the loss of the Continental account on the total business of KRATZER'S nor that
KRATZER'S might have mitigated the damages by
obtaining other customers to replace Continental. This
is not the type of case where mitigation of damges is
required. To state that KRATZER'S must find other
customers to replace the loss caused by l\IONTER is
to deny KRATZER'S the right to grow. It has a right
to the profit from all the customers it can obtain. Had
:MONTER not caused the termination of the Continental account, KRATZER'S business could have grown
and become more profitable with each new customer
obtained. If these new customers must replace Continental, KRATZER'S are denied the profits to which
they are otherwise entitled. Appellant relies entirely
upon Gnttinger v. Cala1.'Cras Cement Company, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 ( 1951), for his position that
the total business must be considered. That case is wholly inapplicable. There suit was brought to enjoi~ a
nuisance created by discharges from a <'cment company
and for damages caused to nearby cattle businesses during the three years prior to the time of trial. An injunction was issued and there was no question in the case
as to future damages. Only losses already incurred
were in issue and those were not, but should have been,
proved by the Plaintiffs from the actual effect on their
business as a whole during the past three years. That
case is also distinguishable from the instant case be·
cause it was based on the loss to the cattle businesses of
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a portion of their production facilities (the land on
which their cattle were pastured) which does not necessarily cause a loss in total production or total or net
income. Had :MONTER caused damage to some of
KRATZER'S equipment, which might not have been
in use or necessary to total production at the time, then
this case would have been comparable. However, the
loss caused to KRATZER'S was of a substantial
customer which directly and obviously caused a loss of
income. Fixed overhead remains the same, labor and
materials may be saved, but income is lost whether or
not the rest of the business is affected. In fact, the effect of this loss to KRATZER'S on the total business
was stipulated to at the trial when the income from the
Continental account was apportioned 47% to overhead
and 53% to profit. The effect on the total business of
KRATZER'S was a loss of profit in the amount of
$1,0GO.OO per month. Appellant can not now complain
about a fact which he has established by his own stipulation. It is also possible that the loss to KRATZER'S
could have been established by proof as to total income
before and after November 8, 1971, but the trial in this
case was set on December IO, 1971, at the insistence of
appellant. One month was not nearly enough time to
establish the difference in income after l\tIONTER's
wrongful action, let alone compile the records of that
business and present them to the Court. KRATZER'S
established its damages "by the most accurate basis
possible under the circumstances." It produced "the
best evidence reasonably obtainable." Quoting from ap-
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pellant's Brief, page 26, and 1llt. States Telephone &
Telegraph Compa11.11 t'. Ilinchcliffe, 204 F. 2d 381, at
383 (10th Cir., 1953).
Appellant further relies on Schoenberg v. Forrest,
253 S.\V. 2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App., 1952), a case invoking breach of a twenty-year contract. Damages were
based upon only eight months' experience under that
contract which the court held to be insufficient upon
which to speculate as to what might happen over the
next twenty years. That case, too, does not help appellant since here we have seventeen years' experience
which would have continued into the future except for
the actions of .l\IONTER, as l\lr. Hart testified. Therefore, no speculation into the future is involved, only
a reasonable inference based upon undisputed facts.
Appellant also claims that the trial court has assumed that there will be no changes in the business in
the future-'no increased competition, no increased
costs, no depressed market, etc. It should be sufficient
to point out that appellant produced no proof of the
possibility of any of these matters. Furthermore, the
trial court did not consider the possibility of an increase
in business with Continental, nor of an increased profit
margin based upon better equipment or efficiencies.
Appellant has chosen to ignore the other side of the
coin. KRATZER'S has met its burden of proof and
the Court has made the findings based upon ample evi·
dence. Having failed to produce any evidence to the
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contrary, appellant has no reason to complain of the
findings and judgment in KRATZER'S favor.

IV.
The Trial Court properly denied appellant's motion for a new trial.
After the court rendered its judgment in this case,
appellant filed a motion for a new trial asserting as
grounds therefor, surprise, newly discovered evidence,
excessive damages, insufficient evidence and error in
law. The court denied this motion for failure to establish any of these asserted grounds. The only ground
upon which appellant now complains of the court's denial is that of claimed newly discovered evidence. This
is based upon two alleged facts which are not true and
there is nothing in the record to support them.
Appellant implies that he could have produced
evidence at the trial that KRATZER'S owed a debt
to the Internal Revenue Service which might have affected the court's decision and that evidence of this
debt was not available at the time of trial since no lien
was filed until after trial. This fact is not true, as shown
by the counter-affidavit in the record (R. 15). The
l.R.S. filed a lien with the Salt Lake County Recorder
on September 27, 1971. The only new evidence which
justifies a new trial is that which could not have been
discovered by the exercise of due diligence prior to
trial. U.R.C.P. 59 (a) (4); Universal, Investment Co.
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vs. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564, 567-8
( 1965). Furthermore, discovery after trial of matters
of public record is not a ground for new trial unless on
diligent search and inquiry in the proper office, such
record is not discovered. Drcspel vs. Drespel, 56 Nev.
368, 45 P.2d 7!l2, rch., 54 P.2d 226 (193.5); In re Hammer's Estate, 145 Wash. 322, 260 Pac. 532. The socalled new evidence claimed by appellant was a matter of public record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office as well as the office of the Internal Revenue
Service long prior to trial. No showing has been made
that appellant made any effort to discover this evidence
prior to trial. The same diligence exercised by appellant
and hiS' attorneys after trial, if exercised by them prior
to trial, would have revealed this information and it is
therefore not "newly discovered evidence. l\1oreover,
the fact of this debt to the I.R.S. was known to :MONTER person~lly prior to trial ( R. 18) and he did not
even bother to appear at the trial to tell the court what
he knew ( R. 26) . The trial court did not consider this
evidence sufficient to justify a different result. Decisions on new trial motions rest within the discretion of
the trial court and since appellant has failed to show
abuse, the trial court's decision should not be disturbed.
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc., supra.
The further claim by appellant that respondent's
business was closed within a month after trial and has
remained closed, the latter being untrue, does not ac·
count for the fact that appellant substantially con·
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tributed to the cause of this closure by denying cash
flow to respondent out of which the taxes could have
been paid. Nor does it account. for the fact that respondent immediately arranged for the continuation of
that business and that respondent is presently actively
engaged in the same business though at a reduced profit
because of NlONTER's wrongful actions.
CONCLUSION
The Court's findings and judgment are fully supported by the evidence and the law. By failing to sue
for rent, appellant did not follow the requirements of
the unlawful detainer statute and thereby obtained an
invalid judgment. The actions of appellant in attempting to enforce that invalid judgment caused damages
for which he must respond. Appellant's further refusal
to follow the requirements of § 78-36-10, U.C.A. by
waiting five days before executing on his judgment deprived respondent of his statutory right to pay the rent
into court and be restored to his estate. This substantive
right granted by the legislature cannot be abridged by
the procedural rules. Only the legislature can abridge
or modify this right. This statute does not permit a
tenant to "thumb his nose" at his landlord nor does it
deprive him of his property without due process of law,
as claimed by appellant. The statute only applies in the
limited situations where rent is unpaid under an unexpired lease and it provides for full payment to the
landlord of all rent, costs and fees. He receives everything for which he has bargained in his lease plus his
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expenses. Any provision in the lease providing that the
landlord may re-take possession of the premises with.
out following the requirements of the Forcible Entry
and Detainer Statute is void as against public policy.
Freeway Parl.;; Building, Inc. vs. TV cstern States
Wholesale Supply, supra, at page 781.
The court's determination of damages was based
not only upon the "the best evidence reasonably obtainable" by respondent, but also upon the most unquestionable basis possible, the stipulations of appellant and
the uncontroverted testimony of two impartial witnesses-one of them an expert witness-all of which
the trial court chose to believe. The damages were reduced to present value based upon prevailing interest
rates. The punitive damages assessed were based upon
the wreckless and intentional disregard by appellant of
respondent's rights with full know ledge of those rights
and of the c~nsequences. That is sufficient to imply a
malicious state of mind. The fact that appellant was
acting through his chosen attorneys does not relieve him
from the responsibility for their acts. He is liable for
the acts of his agents, especially when he has specifically instructed them to take whatever action they determine necessary. The attorneys cannot ask for mercy
because their actions have caused damage for which
their principal is liable. This is not "punishment" but
responsibility.
The appellant's assertions in this case are contrary
to the law and the evidence and are based on some facts

33

not in the record nor proved at the trial. Since appellant
has not shown that the trial court's findings have no
support in the evidence, the trial ·court's decision should
be affirmed.
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BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK
By: ...................... ·············------------------·--········

RALPH J. :MARSH, ESQ.

A ttorncys for Defendant-Respondent,

KRA'f ZER'S SPECIALTY
BREAD COl\:IP ANY
1111 Deseret Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 355-7591

